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Immigration, Trade and Product Differentiation
Roger White1
ABSTRACT
Immigrant-trade links are examined with an emphasis placed on variation
across product types and home country income classifications. Data for the US
and 70 trading partners spanning the 1980-1997 period are employed. We find
the immigrant-trade relationship varies based on degree of product differentia-
tion and by home country per-capita income. In response to a hypothetical 10
percent increase in the immigrant stock variable, US imports of differentiated
goods from high income countries increase by approximately 2 percent. A like
increase in the immigrant stock from low income countries increases US differ-
entiated goods imports by 4.25 percent, while exports of homogenous goods
increase by 2.5 to 4.3 percent. Imports of homogenous goods from high income
nations and exports of all product types to these nations appear unaffected by
immigrant stock levels. 
1. INTRODUCTION
IN MANY NATIONS, immigration policy is a sensitive and contentious politicaland social issue. Often, the debate is focused on the negative effects thatimmigrants are thought to impose on host countries, with scant attention
paid to potential benefits that immigrants may convey. In the United States,
the policy debate has coincided with a sharpening of the tone, and a rise in
the volume, of rhetoric advocating assimilation and, consequently, a move-
ment away from the concepts of multiculturalism and tolerance. The influ-
ences of immigrants on the US labour market, its cultural institutions, poten-
tial strains on the government's ability to provide social services (i.e. health
care and education) and the spectre of terrorism have all served as the basis
for such sentiments. The public and political discourses in other developed
nations — Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the UK, among others —
reflect similar concerns. We examine a potential benefit of immigration that
has been largely absent in the policy debate: the relationship between immi-
grants and host-home country trade flows. More specifically, we explore vari-
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ations in the US immigrant-trade link across product types and home coun-
tries. That immigration is a controversial and vigorously-debated issue in
many developed nations underscores the importance of accounting for all
effects that immigrants may have on their host economies.
Immigrants are thought to enhance host-home country trade via two
channels. First, immigrants' preferences for home country products may
increase host country imports from their home countries if immigrants arrive
to find neither the desired home country products nor reasonable substitutes
are available. This is akin to the home bias effect first reported by McCallum
(1995). When applicable to immigrants, this may be thought of as a trans-
planted home bias effect. Second, immigrants may increase host-home coun-
try trade if they are able to exploit connections to social and/or business net-
works in their home countries, or if they possess knowledge of home country
customs or social norms that are expected to be adhered to when conducting
business. Such knowledge may include information regarding the initiation
and execution of informal contract structures or personal connections that, if
successfully exploited, reduce search costs associated with matching potential
trading partners or that convey reputation-based assurances and, thus,
reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour (Rauch and Watson, 2004; Rauch
and Trindade 2002; Rauch 1999; 2001). This second channel is expected
potentially to increase both host country exports to and imports from the
home country.
Using US data, Gould (1994) first documents a positive relationship
between immigrants and host-home country trade. Subsequent studies have
documented immigrant-trade links, using aggregate measures of bilateral
exports and imports, for several other host countries. For example, Wagner et
al. (2002), Head and Ries (1998) and Helliwell (1997) examine the Canadian
immigrant-trade link. Ching and Chen (2000) report a positive relationship
between immigrants and Canada-Taiwan trade. Bryant et al. (2004), Blanes
(2003), Piperakis et al. (2003) and Girma and Yu (2002) report links for New
Zealand, Spain, Greece and the UK, respectively. At the sub-national level,
Combes et al. (2005) finds evidence of an intra-France migrant-trade relation-
ship, and several studies have identified a link between immigrants and US
state-level exports (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2008; Dunlevy, 2006; Herander and
Saavedra, 2005; Bardhan and Guhathakurta, 2005; Co et al., 2004).
We provide for a more detailed accounting of the influence of immi-
grants on a host economy by examining variation in the US immigrant-trade
link across both product types and home country income classifications. The
Rauch (1999) classification system is used to classify 4-digit SITC industries
as producing either differentiated or homogenous (reference priced and organ-
ised exchange goods) goods. World Bank (2003) classifications are relied upon
to categorise home countries as high, upper middle, lower middle or low
income.2 Drawing upon the existing literature, we formulate and examine sev-
eral hypotheses relating to the immigrant-trade relationship. Employing data
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for the US and 70 trading partners that span the years 1980-1997, we report
significant variation in immigrant-trade links across product and home coun-
try income classifications.3 Generally, immigrant-trade links are strongest for
US imports of differentiated products from low income home countries and
weakest for US exports of homogenous products to high income home coun-
tries. Since, on net, trade confers benefits to the US and its trading partners,
policymakers may wish to consider the corresponding influences of immi-
grants when formulating immigration policy. Although specific results pre-
sented here may be applicable only to the US, general findings are potentially
informative for the public and policymakers alike in the US and other devel-
oped host economies. We proceed as follows. Section 2 details the hypotheses
to be tested. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the data and estimation results, respec-
tively. Section 5 concludes.
2. IMMIGRANT-TRADE LINK HYPOTHESES
Girma and Yu (2002), examining UK trade with 48 nations, stratify their sam-
ple into two groups: ‘commonwealth’ and ‘non-commonwealth’ nations. A pos-
itive immigrant-trade link is reported only for the latter group. The authors
contend that any pro-trade influences of immigrants’ preferences and/or con-
nections to social or business networks would exist regardless of home coun-
try. Thus, pro-trade influences of immigrants would be relatively uniform
across home countries. However, institutional dissimilarity — for example,
similar judicial systems, formal and informal contracting structures, and com-
munications systems — would provide immigrants additional opportunities to
enhance trade. Supporting this conclusion, Dunlevy (2006) reports that immi-
grants from countries that are institutionally dissimilar to the US increase
state-level exports. This implies the influence of immigrants from countries
that are relatively dissimilar to the US would be greater in magnitude com-
pared to the influences of immigrants from countries that are similar to the
US. Allowing for the possibility that both immigrant-specific factors and cul-
tural/institutional dissimilarities have the potential to increase trade, we
employ per capita income as a proxy for US-home country cultural/institu-
tional similarity. This results in our first hypothesis.
H1: An immigrant-trade link exists; however, the influences of immigrants
from low income countries affect trade to a greater degree than do the influ-
ences of immigrants from high income countries.
As mentioned in the introduction, immigrants are thought to increase
host-home country trade flows through two channels. The finding of home
bias by McCallum (1995) has been confirmed by a number of researchers,
including Wei (1998) and Helliwell (1996). Helliwell (1997) and Engel and
Rogers (1996) also report border effects which may indicate the presence of
home bias. One would expect that such biases would be more pronounced for
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differentiated products as compared to relatively homogenous goods, if only
because a higher likelihood exists for finding reasonable substitutes for
homogenous goods. Rauch and Watson (2004), Rauch and Trindade (2002),
and Rauch (1999; 2001) posit that networks exert a stronger impact on trade
in differentiated goods. Homogenous products have common characteristics
and are, by definition, independent of producers' traits or geographic locale,
while differentiated products are characterised by potentially complete
unknown information. The implication is that the potential for immigrants to
possess asymmetric information or to exploit network connections that facili-
tate increases in host-home country trade is diminished for homogenous
goods compared to differentiated, goods; thus, a second hypothesis is gener-
ated.
H2: The immigrant-trade link varies based on product type with the strength
of the link increasing with the degree of product differentiation.
Finally, we have described the channels through which immigrants
may influence host-home country trade: immigrants are thought to increase
trade through network effects and via preference effects. Rauch (2001) sug-
gests that an immigrant’s home bias increases only imports while successful
exploitation of network connections may increase both imports and exports. If
so, coefficients may be larger if imports are employed to measure trade com-
pared to when exports are employed.
H3: Coefficients on immigrant stock variables are of greater magnitude if
imports are employed as the measure of trade as compared to when exports
are employed.
Stated collectively, hypotheses 1 through 3 imply that immigrant-trade
links are strongest for US imports of differentiated goods from low income
countries and weakest for US exports of homogenous goods to high income
countries.
3. ESTIMATION EQUATION AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
Tinbergen (1962) first applies the gravity equation to trade flows. Subsequent
researchers have used the specification in a variety of forms, with several
papers having established theoretical foundations for the model.4 In its sim-
plest form, the gravity equation states that trade during year t between coun-
tries i and j,    , increases with the countries’ combined economic mass and
decreases with distance,    . Equation (1) illustrates.
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Higher home country GDP (Yjt) implies greater export markets for US products
and an increased probability of US imports. Similarly, higher US GDP (Yit) sig-
nals an increased capacity for the US to export and to import. Distance
between Washington, DC and the capital city of nation j (Dij), measured in
miles using the great circle method, is a proxy for transport costs. Λ is the con-
stant of proportionality.
As mentioned, over time, researchers have augmented the basic gravi-
ty specification to include a number of factors that potentially facilitate or
inhibit trade. Drawing upon the existing literature, we control for additional
factors that may enhance or diminish trade flows by modifying equation (1) to
include the following series of trade-inhibiting (Φijt) and trade-facilitating (Γijt
and ψjt) variables.
Appending these vectors to equation (1) yields equation (5).
Taking natural logarithms of the continuous variables on both sides of equa-
tion (5), including dummy variables that classify home countries as upper
middle (UMID), lower middle (LMID), or low (LOW) income, and corresponding
interaction terms to permit examination of variation in links across home
country income classifications, and adding an assumed independently and
identically distributed error term yields the following estimation equation.
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As the US is the host country, we drop the subscript i from equation (6). Since
no trade is reported for 10.7 percent of the US-home country pairings, we
retain these observations and utilise a Tobit specification when performing our
estimations. To examine variation in the immigrant-trade relationship across
product types, the series of dependent variables, Tjt, includes values for US
imports and exports of ‘differentiated’, ‘reference priced’ and ‘organised
exchange’ goods. We use each of these trade values in turn when estimation
equation (6). Trade data are from the World Trade Flows database (Feenstra,
2000).
The classification of products is based on the system developed by
Rauch (1999). Rauch classifies products as homogenous or differentiated
based on whether reference prices are available. Homogenous products
include both goods that are traded on organised exchanges and goods not
traded on organised exchanges but for which ‘reference prices’ are available.
Differentiated goods, on the other hand, do not have reference prices. Such
products are characterised by sufficiently imperfect information that prohibits
standardised pricing and, thus, discourages the creation of formal or quasi-
formal exchanges. Beginning with 5-digit SITC-level product classifications,
Rauch classified products as organised exchange goods if they were listed in
either the International Commodity Markets Handbook or the Knight-Ridder
CRB Commodity Yearbook. Reference priced goods were classified as such if
price quotations were found in Commodity Prices. If reference prices were not
available, products were classified as differentiated goods. Classification at the
4-digit SITC level was made based on which of the three product types
accounted for the largest share of the value of world trade at the 4-digit SITC
level. Since ambiguities sometimes affected classification at the 4-digit SITC
level, Rauch constructed a ‘conservative’ classification system, which min-
imises the number of goods classified as homogenous (i.e. organised exchange
or reference priced), and a ‘liberal’ classification system that maximises the
number of goods classified as homogenous. We employ both classifications in
our empirical analysis.
The inclusion of the three dummy variables that identify home coun-
tries as upper middle, lower middle or low income permits examination of vari-
ation in immigrant-trade links across home country income classifications.5
Each dummy variable is interacted, separately, with the immigrant stock vari-
able. The fourth classification, high income, is the null classification in the
estimations. Thus, estimated coefficients on the immigrant stock variable   are
‘base’ effects that can be thought of as trade effects of immigrants from the
typical home country. Coefficients on interaction terms capture variation from 
base effects. For example, the coefficient on the immigrant stock variable   
estimates the influence exerted by the typical immigrant on US-home country
trade, regardless of home country income classification. The coefficients on
the terms that interact the immigrant stock variable with the income classifi
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cation dummy variables are estimated deviations from base effects
for upper middle, lower middle and low income home countries, respectively.
Thus,          ,          and          are estimates of the influences of immigrants
from upper middle, lower middle and low income countries, respectively, while
provides an estimate of the influence of immigrants from high income coun-
tries on US-home country trade.
The IMMjt  variable is constructed using data from the US Bureau of the
Census (2000) and US INS (1999; 2002). Census data provides immigrant
stocks for 1980 and 1990. We accept these counts as accurate and use inflow
data to estimate intra-census year immigrant stocks. For the years 1981-
1989, estimates are derived as follows.
θj adjusts for return migration, death, and amnesties. It is derived as the 1990
census count of immigrants from each country in the US and the sum of the
1980 census count plus inflows during the years 1981-1990 divided by ten.
The 1991-1997 portion of the sample is also adjusted using this proportional
difference. The adjustment factor is the final term in equation (8).
The remaining explanatory variables include FDI OUTjt and FDI INjt,
which control for potential effects of economic integration on trade (US BEA,
2000; 1987).6 Lipsey (1993) reports that, by the late 1980s, foreign affiliates
accounted for a quarter of US exports and over a third of imports. Gould
(1994) includes the sum of US FDI in each home country and home country
FDI in the US to test for robustness. We alter Gould’s measure, dividing the
FDI values by each home country's GDP to gain relative measures of FDI, and
distil the measure into two variables since FDI flows into the US may affect
trade differently than US FDI outflows. An additional measure of integration
that is more directly linked to trade flows, the ADD FTAsjt variable, is given as
the number of trade agreements the home country is party to.7
Since trade with the US may depend on the availability of outside (i.e.
non-US) trading opportunities, we include a measure of the economic remote
ness of each home country. Given as , the variable
is a measure of quasi-distance (Wagner et al. 2002). Djk is the distance
between each home country j and each nation k other than the US, Ykt is the
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GDP of country k and Ywt represents gross global product (World Bank,
2006).8 Economic remoteness can result from a nation being geographically
isolated (e.g. New Zealand) or located near relatively small economies (e.g.
South Africa). More remote nations face a lack of non-US trading partners
and, thus, may engage in more trade with the US. While we include dummy
variables to control for variation in trade across home country income classi
fications, we also include GDP per capita,            , as a control for variation
in the influence of average wealth, or standard of living, within each home
country income classification (World Bank, 2003). To capture terms of trade
effects, the change in the exchange rate, defined as foreign currency units per
dollar, is included (IMF, 2002). An increase in the exchange rate indicates an
appreciation of the US Dollar, which is expected to increase US imports and
decrease US exports.
Equation (6) also includes a number of dummy variables. Common lan-
guage is often cited as a proxy for cultural similarity and is found to be an
important determinant of trade flows (Brainard, 1997; Girma and Yu, 2002;
Hutchison, 2002; Engel and Rogers, 1996; Helliwell, 1997; Wagner et al.,
2002). As shared language may also facilitate the writing and enforcement of
contracts or lower costs associated with the matching of potential trading
partners, ENGLISHj indicates whether English is commonly used in the
respective home country (Crystal, 1993). FTAjt signals membership in a trade
agreement with the US. To control for petroleum imports, OPECjt identifies
home countries that are members of OPEC. To account for an important geo-
graphic impediment to trade, SEAPORTj represents coastal access.  MILITARYjt
signals US military involvement in the home country and serves as a proxy for
general risk or uncertainty. Hufbauer et al. (1997) find sanctions reduce trade,
on average, by up to one-third. Thus, we include SANCTIONSjt to control for
US-imposed economic sanctions on the home country.9 Finally, to absorb
effects of policy shifts and macroeconomic fluctuations, we include a set of
time (year) dummies, Ωt. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable All countries
High
income
countries
U-middle
income
countries
L-middle
income
countries
Low
income
countries
Immigrants
Δ ln Exchange Rate
GDP 
GDP Per Capita 
215,959
(560,400)
0.122
(0.342)
239,973
(628,787)
8,025
(10,359)
165,018***
(210,446)
0.153
(0.424)
42,663***
(45,504)
1,850***
(922)
116,233***
(165,881)
0.168*
(0.388)
52,381***
(125,968)
409***
(185)
547,571***
(1,398,160)
0.183**
(0.291)
151,572***
(183,129)
5,082***
(2,373)
202,147
(250,139)
0.035***
(0.178)
570,113***
(990,645)
20,763***
(9,265)
cont....
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Distance (m. from Washington, DC)
Remote
FDI IN
FDI OUT
English
FTA
Military
Number of additional FTAs
OPEC
Sanctions
Seaport
Imports - conservative classification
Differentiated products
Reference priced products
Organised exchange products
Exports - conservative classification
Differentiated products
Reference priced products
Organised exchange products
Imports - liberal classification
Differentiated products
Reference priced products
Organised exchange products
Exports - liberal classification
Differentiated products
Reference priced products
Organised exchange products
N
7,942.42
(3,896)
2.36
(1.786)
0.015
(0.067)
0.044
(0.117)
0.529
(0.499)
0.02
(0.141)
0.033
(0.177)
0.762
(0.757)
0.069
(0.254)
0.141
(0.349)
0.929
(0.258)
3,169,450
(10,821,700)
547,885
(1,981,240)
820,077
(2,152,380)
2,372,250
(7,347,590)
462,143
(1,142,440)
260,424
(580,722)
3,084,550
(10,592,400)
514,380
(1,772,300)
915,300
(2,424,460)
2,217,720
(7,039,540)
475,785
(1,101,410)
395,391
(960,017)
1,260
8,038
(3,574)
1.093***
(1.437)
0.022***
(0.037)
0.037*
(0.043)
0.468**
(0.5)
0.055***
(0.227)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.997***
(0.671)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.01***
(0.102)
0.906
(0.292)
8,011,200***
(17,764,900)
1,326,870***
(3,314,100)
906,109
(2,657,900)
5,628,500***
(11,738,100)
1,034,920***
(1,773,390)
591,894***
(860,575)
7,787,190***
(17,393,600)
1,241,030***
(2,880,460)
1,241,460*
(3,381,470)
5,255,190***
(11,305,300)
1,038,160***
(1,620,170)
962,226***
(1,489,950)
396
7,696
(3,350)
3.121***
(1.976)
0.001***
(0.001)
0.037
(0.042)
0.556
(0.498)
0.025
(0.156)
0.000***
(0.000)
1.148***
(0.603)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.056***
(0.23)
0.889
(0.315)
2,279,210
(6,910,690)
325,975***
(543,431)
1,185,700**
(2,166,030)
2,767,010
(6,969,240)
475,949
(1,034,220)
195,982
(472,219)
2,168,140
(6,726,260)
398,342
(971,964)
1,242,770*
(2,206,470)
2,580,250
(6,590,140)
586,622
(1,290,050)
269,657***
(609,414)
162
7,409**
(4,272)
2.887***
(1.711)
0.023
(0.109)
0.07**
(0.194)
0.49
(0.501)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.05
(0.217)
0.824
(0.852)
0.166***
(0.372)
0.225***
(0.418)
0.955**
(0.207)
441,313***
(978,567)
113,782***
(228,313)
676,451
(1,668,500)
575,290***
(680,426)
131,054***
(132,819)
66,283***
(64,218)
440,754***
(1,018,530)
82,980***
(193,703)
675,915**
(1,617,200)
542,882***
(650,361)
144,121***
(140,004)
83,739***
(84,839)
414
8,725***
(3,928)
3.014***
(1.184)
0.0003***
(0.001)
0.021***
(0.031)
0.688***
(0.464)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.072**
(0.258)
0.16***
(0.367)
0.065
(0.246)
0.251***
(0.434)
0.938
(0.242)
668,011***
(2,642,200)
123,272***
(310,347)
661,181
(1,798,770)
260,331***
(645,604)
128,813***
(351,037)
54,026***
(112,713)
672,410***
(2,716,920)
62,646***
(193,140)
592,028***
(1,642,960)
248,479***
(621,782)
112,660***
(301,668)
80,002***
(174,473)
288
Standard deviations in parentheses. "***", "**" and "*" denote statistical significance from the overall
mean at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. GDP, imports and exports presented in 1,000s of 1995
US Dollars. GDP per capita is in 1995 US Dollars. See text for explanation of country classifications.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results of estimating equation (6), employing differentiated, reference
priced and organised exchange trade values, as determined using the conser-
vative goods classification, are presented in Table 2. Results generated using
trade values based on the liberal goods classifications are reported in Table 3.
Generally speaking, the estimation results are consistent across the two clas-
sification systems. Coefficients on the immigrant stock variables imply that a
10 per cent increase in the immigrant stock from a high income country
increases US imports of differentiated products from the home country by 2
per cent (conservative classification) to 2.2 per cent (liberal classification).
Summation of coefficients on the immigrant stock variable and interaction
terms provides estimates of the respective influences of immigrants on US
trade. For example, assumed 10 percent increases in the immigrant stocks
from low income and lower middle income countries correspond to increases
in US imports of differentiated products of approximately 4.3 percent and 4
percent, respectively. Imports of homogenous (i.e. reference priced and organ-
ised exchange) goods from high income nations and exports of all product
types to these nations appear unaffected by immigrant stock levels.
When considering the coefficients on terms interacting immigrant stock
values with home country income classifications, we frequently find signifi-
cance. For example, in both Table 2 and in Table 3 we find, for upper middle
income and low income home countries, all coefficients on terms interacting
the immigrant stock variable with the relevant home country income classifi-
cation dummy variable are positive and significant. Similarly, in Table 2, we
see significant coefficients on interaction terms relating to lower middle
income home countries for US imports of differentiated goods and exports of
reference priced and organised exchange goods. In Table 3, for the lower mid-
dle income classification, coefficients on interaction terms are positive and
significant for all trade measures except US exports of differentiated goods.
Since coefficients on the terms interacting the immigrant stock variable with
the respective home country income classification dummy variables represent
deviations from the influence of immigrants on US trade with high income
home countries, we have evidence of variation in immigrant-trade effects
across both product types and home country classifications.
The remaining coefficients provide expected results. A depreciation of
the home country’s currency relative to the dollar increases US imports and
lowers exports. The positive and generally significant coefficients on the GDP
and GDP per capita variables indicate that the US tends to trades more inten-
sively with larger and wealthier economies. We find that higher transport
costs, as represented by the distance variable, reduce trade, while economic
remoteness generally corresponds with increased US-home country trade.
Higher US FDI in the home country increases trade; however, higher home
country FDI in the US appears to increase trade considerably less. This
appears reasonable as US FDI outflows are primarily equity while US inflows
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ln Immigrantsjt
Upper middle income home countryj x
ln  Immigrantsjt
Lower middle income home countryj x
ln  Immigrantsjt
Low income home countryj x
ln  Immigrantsjt
Δ ln Exchange Ratejt
ln GDPjt
ln GDP Per Capitajt
ln Distancej
ln Remotejt
ln FDI INjt
ln FDI OUTjt
Englishj
FTAjt
Militaryjt
Number of additional FTAsjt
OPECjt
Sanctionsjt
Seaportj
Upper middle income home countryj
Lower middle income home countryj
Low income home countryj
Constant
N
ANOVA-based fit measure
0.204***
(0.062)
0.137*
(0.077)
0.186**
(0.074)
0.23***
(0.068)
0.357***
(0.103)
1.06***
(0.038)
0.211**
(0.086)
-0.287***
(0.1)
0.199***
(0.057)
-0.027
(0.018)
0.045*
(0.026)
0.434***
(0.088)
2.168***
(0.265)
-0.358
(0.227)
0.514***
(0.061)
-1.281***
(0.15)
-0.451***
(0.115)
0.773***
(0.084)
1.816**
(0.914)
-1.308
(0.863)
-0.612
(0.837)
-9.057***
(1.43)
1,260
0.81
Explanatory variables
Differen-
tiated
Reference
priced
Organised
exchange
Dependent variable Imports Exports
Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indi-
cated as follows. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Table 2: Estimated effects of immigration on trade flows, 
conservative goods classification (Tobit Specifications)
Differen-
tiated
Reference
priced
Organised
exchange
0.126
(0.082)
0.201**
(0.101)
0.053
(0.099)
0.293***
(0.095)
0.309**
(0.154)
0.884***
(0.051)
0.505***
(0.116)
-0.739***
(0.133)
0.118
(0.075)
0.042*
(0.024)
0.215***
(0.036)
0.782***
(0.119)
1.793***
(0.343)
-0.923***
(0.309)
0.267***
(0.082)
-0.581***
(0.205)
-0.269*
(0.154)
0.203*
(0.111)
-2.281*
(1.187)
-0.108
(1.151)
-1.46
(1.186)
-3.281*
(1.921)
1,260
0.66
-0.122
(0.11)
0.262**
(0.126)
0.159
(0.138)
-0.038
(0.132)
0.676***
(0.177)
1.246***
(0.071)
1.166***
(0.162)
-0.631***
(0.175)
0.286***
(0.094)
0.003
(0.031)
0.421***
(0.046)
0.207
(0.15)
-0.18
(0.42)
-2.159***
(0.407)
0.387***
(0.105)
2.681***
(0.264)
-0.55**
(0.22)
0.932***
(0.148)
-5.983***
(1.505)
-6.677***
(1.636)
-2.365
(1.655)
8.28***
(2.664)
1,260
0.58
0.05
(0.035)
0.13***
(0.043)
0.028
(0.041)
0.277***
(0.038)
-0.076
(0.058)
0.729***
(0.021)
-0.015
(0.048)
-0.64***
(0.056)
0.003
(0.032)
0.024**
(0.01)
0.277***
(0.015)
0.419***
(0.049)
0.702***
(0.148)
-0.299**
(0.127)
0.243***
(0.034)
-0.5***
(0.083)
-0.267***
(0.064)
0.043
(0.047)
-1.538***
(0.511)
-0.255
(0.482)
-3.103***
(0.467)
8.332***
(0.798)
1,260
0.89
-0.119
(0.097)
0.213***
(0.059)
0.191***
(0.056)
0.573***
(0.051)
-0.181**
(0.078)
0.821***
(0.029)
0.151**
(0.065)
-0.622***
(0.075)
0.089**
(0.043)
0.009
(0.014)
0.226***
(0.02)
0.357***
(0.067)
0.865***
(0.2)
-0.306*
(0.174)
0.149***
(0.047)
-0.666***
(0.115)
-0.285***
(0.087)
0.18***
(0.063)
-2.675***
(0.69)
-2.112***
(0.653)
-6.685***
(0.632)
7.391***
(1.081)
1,260
0.80
-0.11*
(0.061)
0.208***
(0.076)
0.395***
(0.074)
0.35***
(0.068)
-0.242**
(0.103)
0.916***
(0.038)
0.611***
(0.089)
-0.935***
(0.1)
0.228***
(0.057)
0.007
(0.018)
0.294***
(0.027)
0.171*
(0.088)
0.401
(0.259)
-0.026
(0.237)
0.067
(0.061)
-0.245
(0.156)
-0.217*
(0.118)
0.375***
(0.084)
-3.208***
(0.892)
-5.403***
(0.863)
-5.613***
(0.839)
11.798***
(1.465)
1,260
0.73
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ln Immigrantsjt
Upper middle income home countryj x
ln  Immigrantsjt
Lower middle income home countryj x
ln  Immigrantsjt
Low income home countryj x
ln  Immigrantsjt
Δ ln Exchange Ratejt
ln GDPjt
ln GDP Per Capitajt
ln Distancej
ln Remotejt
ln FDI INjt
ln FDI OUTjt
Englishj
FTAjt
Militaryjt
Number of additional FTAsjt
OPECjt
Sanctionsjt
Seaportj
Upper middle income home countryj
Lower middle income home countryj
Low income home countryj
Constant
N
ANOVA-based fit measure
Explanatory variables
Differen-
tiated
Reference
priced
Organised
exchange
Dependent variable Imports Exports
Differen-
tiated
Reference
priced
Organised
exchange
0.219***
(0.062)
0.15*
(0.077)
0.201***
(0.074)
0.206***
(0.068)
0.368***
(0.103)
1.048***
(0.038)
0.203**
(0.086)
-0.268***
(0.1)
0.212***
(0.057)
-0.024
(0.018)
0.049*
(0.026)
0.451***
(0.088)
2.164***
(0.264)
-0.336
(0.227)
0.511***
(0.061)
-1.372***
(0.15)
-0.435***
(0.114)
0.777***
(0.084)
1.948**
(0.913)
-1.498*
(0.863)
-0.343
(0.836)
-9.029***
(1.429)
1,260
0.81
-0.028
(0.064)
0.366***
(0.079)
0.203***
(0.078)
0.474***
(0.075)
0.029
(0.148)
1.15***
(0.04)
0.555***
(0.091)
-0.801***
(0.105)
0.049
(0.059)
0.123***
(0.019)
0.215***
(0.029)
0.719***
(0.094)
0.98***
(0.272)
-0.431*
(0.244)
0.119*
(0.065)
-0.32*
(0.168)
-0.135
(0.121)
0.3***
(0.088)
-3.848***
(0.936)
-1.767*
(0.909)
-3.979***
(0.933)
-8.693***
(1.515)
1,260
0.81
-0.053
(0.058)
0.149**
(0.072)
0.277***
(0.069)
0.345***
(0.064)
-0.182*
(0.097)
0.926***
(0.036)
-0.494***
(0.081)
-0.835***
(0.094)
0.22***
(0.054)
-0.004
(0.017)
0.287***
(0.025)
0.128
(0.083)
0.794***
(0.247)
-0.377*
(0.222)
0.111*
(0.058)
-0.52***
(0.146)
0.028
(0.109)
0.271***
(0.079)
-2.349***
(0.85)
-3.843***
(0.807)
-5.029***
(0.786)
9.275***
(1.352)
1,260
0.76
0.044
(0.035)
0.14***
(0.044)
0.047
(0.042)
0.285***
(0.039)
-0.084
(0.059)
0.724***
(0.022)
-0.019
(0.049)
-0.619***
(0.057)
0.033
(0.033)
0.033***
(0.011)
0.292***
(0.015)
0.454***
(0.051)
0.704***
(0.152)
-0.283**
(0.13)
0.245***
(0.035)
-0.442***
(0.085)
-0.331***
(0.066)
0.011
(0.048)
-1.636***
(0.524)
-0.498
(0.495)
-3.147***
(0.48)
8.389***
(0.819)
1,260
0.88
-0.14
(0.143)
0.216***
(0.054)
0.151***
(0.052)
0.575***
(0.047)
-0.137*
(0.072)
0.815***
(0.027)
-0.217***
(0.06)
-0.752***
(0.07)
0.063
(0.04)
0.005
(0.013)
0.224***
(0.018)
0.382***
(0.062)
0.5***
(0.185)
-0.353**
(0.159)
0.192***
(0.043)
-0.759***
(0.105)
-0.303***
(0.08)
0.264***
(0.058)
-2.831***
(0.638)
-1.865***
(0.603)
-7.095***
(0.584)
9.553***
(0.999)
1,260
0.83
-0.178
(0.117)
0.467***
(0.128)
0.616***
(0.131)
0.393***
(0.125)
0.07
(0.177)
0.777***
(0.065)
0.483***
(0.151)
-0.497***
(0.169)
0.223**
(0.094)
0.02
(0.031)
0.296***
(0.044)
0.68***
(0.149)
2.294***
(0.426)
-1.977***
(0.39)
0.37***
(0.103)
3.003***
(0.263)
-0.237
(0.207)
0.756***
(0.142)
-5.225***
(1.52)
-7.78***
(1.551)
-5.716***
(1.577)
10.206***
(2.552)
1,260
0.52
See Table 2 for notes.
Table 3: Estimated effects of immigration on trade flows, 
liberal goods classification (Tobit Specifications)
include generally more portfolio investment. If English is commonly spoken in
the home country, then US trade (especially in differentiated and reference
priced goods) is higher. US military involvement in the home country damp-
ens trade with US imports falling more than exports. Countries more globally
integrated, politically and economically, trade relatively more with the US,
with trade in differentiated goods affected more than homogeneous goods
trade. Likewise, home countries that are parties to trade agreements with the
US tend to trade more intensively, across all product classifications, with the
US. The US tends to trade less, in terms of export and imports of differentiat-
ed and reference priced goods, with OPEC members; however, the US imports
significantly more organised exchange products (which includes petroleum
and related products) from OPEC members. As expected, sanctions reduce
trade across all product classifications and, if the home country is not land-
locked, trade with the US tends to be higher.
4.1 Immigrant-Trade Link-Related Hypotheses
Revisiting the hypotheses introduced in Section 2, the empirical analysis pro-
vides evidence of a positive relationship between immigration and host-home
country trade. Table 4 provides a summary of observed immigrant-trade links
across each home country income classification and each product classifica-
tion. When considering the relative magnitudes of links across home country
classifications, we find that links are consistently of greater magnitude for
immigrants from low income countries, especially with respect to trade in dif-
ferentiated and reference priced goods. Observed links are weakest - in fact,
non-existent in many instances - for immigrants from high income countries.
Comparing the relative strengths of immigrant-trade links across prod-
uct classifications, we find that immigrants increase US imports of differenti-
ated products regardless of income classification and that immigrants
increase US exports of such goods for all income classifications except the
high income classification. In fact, when considering trade in differentiated
products, in nearly all instances (14 of 16 cases) the estimated influence of
immigrants on either imports of from or exports to the home country is posi-
tive and significant. For the homogenous product classifications, we find that
in only 16 of 32 instances (9 of 16 cases involving reference priced products
and 7 of 16 cases involving organised exchange products) are corresponding
immigrant effects both positive and significant.
Finally, considering the relative magnitudes of immigrants' influences
on imports from and exports to the home country, the former exceed the lat-
ter in 16 of 24 cases. This supports the notion that import elasticities would
be greater than the export elasticities if the import elasticity contains both a
taste effect and a network effect while the export elasticity contains only a net-
work effect. However, it is important to note that while this is an empirical
observation it is also very much possible (and plausible) that immigrants'
influences on host country exports to their home countries is greater than the
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influence of immigrants on host country imports from their home countries.
4.2 Robustness checks
As sample composition may drive the results, we estimate equation (6) using
the full complement of dependent variables while removing one country from
the sample at a time and repeating the process for 70 successive rounds. For
example, in the first round we exclude Australia, while the second round
includes Australia but excludes Argentina. Considerable variation in results
once a country is removed implies the country’s inclusion has a large impact
on results for the full sample. In total, 840 estimations were performed; result-
ing in estimation of 3,360 proportional immigrant effects.10 Exclusion of any
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Conservative goods classification:
Sub-classification:
High income home countries
U- middle income home countries
L-middle income home countries
Low income home countries
Liberal goods classification:
Sub-classification:
High income home countries
U-middle income home countries
L-middle income home countries
Low income home countries
Differenti
ated
0.204***
(3.29)
0.067*
(1.74)
0.39***
(6.55)
0.434***
(8.45)
0.219***
(3.53)
0.069*
(1.79)
0.42***
(7.06)
0.425***
(8.28)
Differenti
ated
0.05
(1.43)
0.18***
(4.53)
0.078**
(2.36)
0.327***
(11.41)
0.044
(1.26)
0.184***
(4.51)
0.091***
(2.68)
0.329***
(11.18)
Organised
exchange
-0.122
(1.11)
0.14
(1.20)
0.037
(0.33)
-0.16
(1.39)
-0.178
(1.52)
0.289**
(2.49)
0.438***
(4.22)
0.215**
(2.13)
Reference
priced
0.126
(1.54)
0.327***
(3.53)
0.179**
(2.25)
0.419***
(5.34)
-0.028
(0.44)
0.338***
(4.61)
0.175***
(2.76)
0.446***
(7.18)
Reference
priced
-0.119
(1.23)
0.094*
(1.75)
0.072
(1.60)
0.454***
(11.72)
-0.14
(0.98)
0.076
(1.53)
0.011
(0.62)
0.435***
(12.16)
Organised
exchange
-0.11*
(1.80)
0.098
(1.40)
0.285***
(4.80)
0.24***
(4.53)
-0.053
(0.91)
0.096
(1.45)
0.224***
(4.00)
0.292***
(5.97)
Imports Exports
Table 4: Summary of observed immigrant-trade links
Immigrant effects are constructed using coefficients presented in Tables 2 and 3. T-statistics are
in parentheses. "***", "**" and "*" denoted significance from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively. The relevant t-statistic for interaction effects is constructed as:
^ ^
^ ^ ^ ^
var( ) var( ) 2cov( , )
IMMIGRANTS INTERACTION
IMMIGRANTS INTERACTION IMMIGRANTS INTERACTI ON
t β β
β β β β
−
=
+ +
.
lower middle or low income nation does not largely alter the estimated group-
level effects for any product types. It appears that the reported immigrant-
trade effects for these classifications are robust to changes in sample compo-
sition.11 Removal of South Korea, a high income country, from the sample
leads to reductions in coefficients on the immigrant stock variable from 0.204
to 0.158 in the conservative classification case and from 0.219 to 0.18 in the
liberal classification case. From 1980 to 1997, the US increased its imports of
differentiated Korean goods by 241 per cent — from $3.2 billion to $11 billion
— while the Korean-born US population more than doubled from roughly
290,000 persons to more than 683,000. A portion of the increased imports
may be attributable to Japanese automakers responding to Voluntary Export
Restraints by shipping ‘knock-down’ kits to Korea for assembly and subse-
quent export to the US.
Examination of immigrant-trade links for the upper middle income
country income classification produces a somewhat similar finding. Due to the
small number of nations in this category, Mexico's trade ties to the US and
that there are more immigrants in the US from Mexico than from any other
nation, it is not surprising that Mexico greatly influences the observed immi-
grant-trade effects. Excluding Mexico changes the estimated immigrant-trade
effects by sixty percent or more in 11 of the 12 categories, with the immigrant-
trade link decreasing in 8 of the 11 instances. The reported results are also
sensitive to the exclusion of Greece, Malaysia, and Uruguay; however, varia-
tion in effects is of much lesser magnitude and may be more attributable to
the small group size than to specific factors regarding these nations.
5. CONCLUSION
We have explored one potential effect of immigration on a host economy, find-
ing that immigrants exert positive influences on US imports from and exports
to their respective home countries. Immigrant-trade links are found to operate
across at least two dimensions — relative home country economic development
and the degree of product differentiation. In response to a hypothetical 10 per
cent increase in the immigrant stock from high income countries, US imports
of differentiated goods from such countries increase by approximately 2 per
cent. Similar increases in immigrant stocks from low income and lower mid-
dles income countries yield increases in US imports of differentiated goods of
approximately 4.3 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively. Further, such increas-
es in the immigrant stock from low income countries correspond to increases
in US exports of homogenous goods ranging from 2.4 per cent to 4.4 per cent.
Imports of homogenous (i.e. reference priced and organised exchange) goods
from high income nations and exports of all product types to these nations
appear unaffected by immigrant stock levels. We also find links between immi-
gration and US trade with high and upper middle income nations are some-
what sensitive to sample composition. However, the link between immigration
from low and lower middle income countries and trade appears robust.
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As mentioned, the public and political debates relating to US immigra-
tion policy have largely focused on purported negative consequences of immi-
gration. The same can be said for many other developed economies that are
net recipients of international migrant flows. The results presented here
inform policy by providing a more complete accounting of the net influences of
immigrants. Conventional wisdom holds that, on average, immigrants from
low and lower middle income countries impose higher costs on the US as com-
pared to immigrants from higher income nations. Thus, without consideration
of our primary findings (i.e. that immigrant-trade links are strongest for immi-
grants from low and lower middle income countries and non-existent, except
for imports of differentiated products, for immigrants from high income coun-
tries), formulation of immigration policy would result in a bias in favour of
immigrants from high and upper middle income nations.
It is important to mention, however, that even if we can accurately cal-
culate any costs associated with immigration, it would still be difficult to
quantify the benefits of immigrant-trade links. Further, any additional bene-
fits of immigration — for example, those related to greater cultural and ethnic
diversity — would need to be measured and incorporated into the analysis
prior to formulating an optimal immigration policy. Nevertheless, the findings
presented here demonstrate the existence of benefits that do exist and that,
thus far, have been absent from the public and political dialogues. We hope
the findings presented here inform the associated debates. Since the results
presented here may not be mirrored by similar studies involving other host
economies, conclusions may only be applicable to the US. That being said, this
paper refines previous estimates of immigrant-trade links, suggests that fur-
ther study is merited and, hopefully, serves as a starting point for subsequent
research.
Accepted for publication: 6 November 2008
APPENDICES
A: Country listing
High-income: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom. Upper-middle income:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Greece, Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago,
Uruguay. Lower-middle income: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan,
Morocco, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Syria, Thailand,
Venezuela. Low-income: Bangladesh, China, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, India, Kenya, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri
Lanka, Tanzania.
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B: Listing of US Military Interventions, 1980-1997
Bolivia (1986): Troops assist raids on cocaine region; El Salvador (1981-92): Troops,
advisors and over-flights aid anti-rebel war; Haiti (1994-96): Troops, naval blockade;
President Aristide restored to office; Honduras (1983-89): Troops help build bases near
borders; Iran (1980): Nuclear threat, aborted raid to rescue embassy hostages; Iran
(1984): Iranian jets shot down over Persian Gulf; Iran (1987-88): Naval bombing US
intervenes on side of Iraq in war; Nicaragua (1981-90): Naval operation, CIA directs
Contra invasions; Panama (1989-90): Troops, bombing, government leaders arrested,
over 2,000 killed; Philippines (1989): Air cover provided for government against coup.
C: Listing of US-imposed Economic Sanctions, 1980-199712
Argentina (1980-83): Improve human rights, adhere to nuclear safeguards; Bolivia
(1980-82): Improve human rights, deter drug trafficking; Brazil (1980-84): Improve
human rights, adhere to nuclear safeguards; China (1989-97): Tiananmen Square,
improve human rights, end nuclear proliferation; Colombia (1996-97): Stop narcotics
trade, improve human rights; Ecuador (1995-98): End border conflict with Peru; El
Salvador (1980-81; 1987-88; 1990-93): Improve human rights, end Civil War; Ethiopia
(1980-92): Settle expropriation claims, improve human rights; Guatemala (1993):
Restore democracy, oppose coup; Haiti (1987-94): Improve human rights, restore
democracy, stop narcotics trade; India (1980-82): Adhere to nuclear safeguards;
Indonesia (1991-97): Improve human rights, end conflict/human rights violations in
East Timor; Iran (1980-81; 1984-97): Release hostages, settle expropriation claims, end
war with Iraq, halt Gulf shipping attacks; Israel (1980-83): Depart from Sinai, adhere
to UN Resolution 242, push Palestinian autonomy talks; Jordan (1990-97): Enforce UN
embargo vs. Iraq; Nicaragua (1981-90; 1992-95): End support for El Salvador rebels,
destabilise Sandinista government; implement civil control over security forces, settle
expropriation claims; Nigeria (1993-97) Improve human rights, establish democracy,
stop narcotics trade; Pakistan (1980-97): Adhere to nuclear safeguards; Panama (1987-
90): Destabilise Noriega; Peru (1991-97): Improve human rights, establish democracy,
end border conflict with Ecuador; Romania (1983-93): Improve human rights, establish
democracy; South Africa (1985-91) End Apartheid; Syria (1986-97): End support of ter-
rorism; Thailand (1991-92) Restore constitutional regime.
ENDNOTES
1. Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Franklin and Marshall College, 415
Harrisburg Pike, Lancaster, PA 17603, USA. Phone: (717) 291-3920 Fax: (717) 291-
4369. Email: roger.white@fandm.edu.
2. Details of both product and home country classification procedures are provided in
Section 3.
3. Appendix A lists the countries included in the dataset.
4. See Anderson (1979), Helpman and Krugman (1985), Bergstrand (1985), Davis
(1995), Deardorff (1998), Feenstra et al (2001), Eaton and Kortum (2001), and
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
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5. The World Bank (1997) lists nations as ‘low’ income if 1995 GNP per capita (GNPC)
< $765; ‘lower middle’ if $765 < GNPC < $3,035; ‘upper middle’ if $3,035 < GNPC <
$9,385; ‘high’ if GNPC > $9,385.
6. US BEA (1987; 2000) FDI data is at historical cost but lacks specific values, for con-
fidentiality reasons. If FDI < $500,000 in any country, we code the FDI value at the
upper limit of $500,000.
7. The variable is equal to the sum of memberships in ANCOM, APEC, ASEAN, ANZ-
ERTA, CARICOM, CARIFTA, CACM, EEA, EFTA, EU, LAFTA, LAIA, and MERCOSUR
(Ghosh and Yamarik, 2004).
8. If i = j, internal distance is the square root of the country’s mass times 0.4 (Head and
Mayer, 2000).
9. Appendix B lists military interventions and Appendix C lists sanctions related to
countries in this study.
10. For each of the 70 excluded home countries, 12 estimations are undertaken with
each producing 4 estimated immigrant effects.
11. Estimation results are available, upon request, from the author.
12. Hufbauer et al. (1997).
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